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International cooperation has become critical in controlling
infectious diseases. In this article, I examine emerging trends in
international law concerning global infectious disease control.
The role of international law in horizontal and vertical gover-
nance responses to infectious disease control is conceptual-
ized; the historical development of international law regarding
infectious diseases is described; and important shifts in how
states, international institutions, and nonstate organizations use
international law in the context of infectious disease control
today are analyzed. The growing importance of international
trade law and the development of global governance mecha-
nisms, most prominently in connection with increasing access to
drugs and other medicines in unindustrialized countries, are
emphasized. Traditional international legal approaches to infec-
tious disease control—embodied in the International Health
Regulations—may be moribund.
G
lobalization creates challenges for infectious disease poli-
cy (1–3). These challenges are horizontal and vertical in
nature. Horizontal challenges constitute problems that arise
between states from global microbial traffic (4). Vertical chal-
lenges, such as inadequate surveillance capacity (5), are prob-
lems countries face inside their territories that require respons-
es within states. States cannot handle horizontal or vertical
challenges without cooperating with each other. Unilateral
efforts have limited impact when the source of the problem is
beyond national jurisdiction (6). Similarly, unindustrialized
countries need assistance to improve domestic public health
(7). International cooperation mechanisms, including interna-
tional law, are crucial to respond to both types of challenges. I
examine the role international law plays in responses to hori-
zontal and vertical challenges, analyze the historical develop-
ment of international law in this area, and explore emerging
trends in international law on infectious diseases that depart
from traditional patterns.
Governance Responses to Globalization
The challenges globalization presents for infectious dis-
ease policy require governance responses. For horizontal chal-
lenges, the response of the government focuses on interstate
cooperation to minimize disease exportation and importation.
Vertical challenges require strategies that reduce disease preva-
lence through improved domestic public health. 
The state constitutes the key actor in infectious disease
governance. Public health is a “public good,” which the public
sector must produce because private actors lack sufficient
incentives or resources (7). Governance responses to globaliza-
tion occur at national, international, and global levels (Figure).
National governance occurs when a state acts within its own
territory to respond to globalization. International governance
involves states cooperating to confront globalization challenges
and often creates norms, rules, and institutions (i.e., regimes) to
facilitate cooperation. Global governance involves not only
states and international organizations but also nonstate actors,
such as multinational corporations and nongovernment organi-
zations (8,9), whose participation becomes critical to the suc-
cess of governance efforts. 
International law has different functions within vertical
and horizontal strategies on infectious diseases and the three
governance frameworks (Table 1). An historical overview of
infectious disease governance delineates the strategic emphases
in the governance frameworks and the functions of internation-
al law. 
Horizontal International Regimes 
and Infectious Diseases, 1851–1951
Before the mid-19th century, states contended with infec-
tious diseases through national governance. States adopted
policies to manage infectious disease threats without interna-
tional cooperation (10). The increased volume and speed of
international trade and travel moved states from national to
international governance in the mid-19th century, and the 1851
International Sanitary Conference marked the beginning of
international governance on infectious diseases (11).
International governance focuses primarily on horizontal
strategies concerning the exportation and importation of infec-
tious diseases. In the first century of international health gover-
nance, three horizontal international legal regimes relating to
infectious diseases appeared—the classical, organizational, and
trade regimes.
International sanitary conventions adopted from the late
19th century until World War II (12) and the World Health
Organization (WHO)’s International Sanitary Regulations
(1951) (later renamed the International Health Regulations
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pose—“to ensure the maximum protection against the interna-
tional spread of disease with minimum interference with world
traffic” (13)—captures the classical regime’s objectives. This
set of rules focuses on transmission of diseases across borders
by requiring that 1) states notify other countries about out-
breaks of specified diseases in their territories and maintain
adequate public health capabilities at points of disease exit and
entry; and 2) disease-prevention measures restricting interna-
tional trade and travel be based on scientific evidence and pub-
lic health principles (13). 
The second horizontal international legal regime is organi-
zational, that is, international health organizations created to
deal with infectious diseases and other public health problems
(10). WHO serves as the leading representative of this gover-
nance framework. Although international law was central to the
creation of international health organizations, the treaties estab-
lishing them did not impose specific duties regarding infectious
disease control (14). States created international health organi-
zations to facilitate horizontal cooperation in public health;
however, unlike the classical regime, the organizational
regime’s legal duties in regard to infectious disease control are
few (14).
The third horizontal regime created in the 1851–1951 peri-
od was the trade regime, represented by the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947), which liberalized trade but
recognized that states may restrict trade to protect health
(GATT, Article XX[b]). Trade-restricting health measures are
legitimate if the measures conform to GATT rules. Thus, the
trade regime contributes to horizontal international governance
on infectious diseases.
Globalization, Infectious Diseases, 
and Governance, 1951–2002
Transition from the Classical to the Trade Regime 
The classical regime’s effectiveness has long been an
issue. From Koch’s criticism of late 19th-century international
sanitary conventions (15) to analysis in the 1960s and 1970s of
the IHR’s problems (16–19), the classical regime’s contribution
to international governance on infectious diseases has been
questionable. In the past half-century, the classical regime’s
importance has diminished, while the trade regime’s influence
has grown. Two events reflect this shift. First, in 1995 WHO
recognized that the IHR did not achieve their twin goals of
maximum protection from the spread of international diseases
while incurring minimum interference with world traffic (20).
WHO launched an effort to revise the regulations to update the
classical regime for new globalization challenges (21). 
Second, the World Trade Organization (WTO) became the
central horizontal regime for international law on infectious
diseases after its creation in 1995. The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement), and the WTO’s powerful dispute
settlement mechanism made WTO more important for infec-
tious disease control policy than the discredited IHR. The trade
regime’s ascendancy over the classical regime is apparent in
the contrast between the public health attention and controver-
sy generated by WTO agreements and the IHR’s obscurity in
global public health discourse.
IHR Revision: Rejuvenation or 
Death of the Classical Regime?
The shift from the classical to the trade regime raises ques-
tions about the IHR revision process. WHO seeks to rejuvenate
the regulations to make the classical regime more effective
against contemporary disease threats (20–22). The IHR revi-
sion process may, however, signal the classical regime’s death. 
The revised IHR would have the same objectives as the
original regulations: maximum protection against the interna-
tional spread of disease while incurring minimum interference
with world traffic (21). To date, the revision process has moved
away from binding legal rules on disease notifications—one of
the classical regime’s pillars—to reliance on global information
networks, represented by WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (hereafter, the Global Network). WHO
argues that this network has helped the organization identify,
verify, and investigate hundreds of outbreaks since 1998,
including outbreaks of cholera, meningitis, hemorrhagic fevers,
viral encephalitis, and anthrax (23). WHO’s Executive Director
of Communicable Diseases claims the Global Network oper-
ates “within the framework” of the IHR (23).
The claim that the IHR support the Global Network is not
correct under international law. First, the Global Network col-
lects data from government as well as nongovernment sources.
The IHR only authorize WHO to use information provided by
member states (13,21). WHO’s proposals to include in the
revised IHR an ability to collect data from nongovernment
sources (21) demonstrate that the IHR cannot provide the legal
foundation for the Global Network’s incorporation of non-
government information. Second, the IHR only address three
diseases—cholera, yellow fever, and plague (13). This limited
coverage was one reason WHO wanted to revise the regulations
(21). The IHR cannot support WHO’s ability to manage,
through the Global Network, meningitis, hemorrhagic fevers,
viral encephalitis, anthrax, and other diseases not subject to the
IHR. 
286 Emerging Infectious Diseases • Vol. 9, No. 3, March 2003
PERSPECTIVE
Figure. Governance responses to globalization challenges. In addition, the Global Network operates without the
revised IHR being in place. From July 1998 to August 2001,
WHO used this network to verify “578 outbreaks of potential
international importance in 132 countries, and investigated
many hundreds more” (23). These statistics suggest that
WHO’s global surveillance strategy operates without the IHR
revision process being completed. Revising the IHR to support
global surveillance—the first raison d’être of the classical
regime—does not appear urgently required given WHO’s
claims of its Global Network’s success.
WHO’s ideas for strengthening global surveillance under
the revised IHR center on requiring member states to report all
“public health emergencies of international concern” (21) to
WHO. Member states would use WHO-developed criteria to
assess whether an outbreak constitutes such an emergency. The
criteria would include whether the event is serious, unexpected,
and likely to involve international spread and to trigger trade
and travel restrictions (21). The problem is that member states
will want to determine for themselves whether a disease event
constitutes a “public health emergency of international con-
cern,” no matter how many useful criteria WHO provides. 
Further, the criteria are subjective rather than objective
(e.g., is a disease event serious?), leaving member states with
the discretion to argue that they did not report an event because
they did not believe the event met the criteria. The fact that
WHO reaches a different conclusion would not trigger legal
consequences for the member state that failed to report an
event. WHO’s proposals on reporting “public health emergen-
cies of international concern” do not indicate whether the crite-
ria will be exclusive and legally binding or whether member
states can use different criteria, which they develop.
The move from specific disease reporting to reporting
“public health emergencies of international concern” indicates
that WHO seeks to improve surveillance on major disease
events rather than routine outbreaks. As the Global Network
suggests, WHO will likely initially learn about major infectious
disease events through sources other than member-state notifi-
cations. The Global Network approach reduces the legal impor-
tance of official member-state reports concerning major disease
events. 
WHO has also proposed that the revised IHR allow mem-
ber states to make confidential, provisional notifications (21).
WHO claims that the IHR do not allow such notifications (21).
Concerning those diseases subject to the regulations, WHO’s
claim is accurate; however, the IHR cover only three diseases.
WHO member states have always been free to consult with
WHO staff about diseases not subject to the IHR. This suggest-
ed change only affects outbreaks of cholera, plague, and yellow
fever, not the majority of infectious diseases considered global
threats.
WHO has also proposed improving maximum protection
against the spread of international diseases by requiring mem-
ber states to have national surveillance systems that meet min-
imum requirements, including the ability to identify “public
health emergencies of international concern” (21). Given the
history of IHR violations and member-state reluctance to limit
sovereignty, member states are unlikely to bind themselves to
minimum standards. Further, WHO’s proposals contain no dis-
cussion of what happens when member states fail to meet those
standards. 
Even if WHO member states agreed to minimum standards
for national surveillance, the requirements would be empty
without the commitment of industrialized countries to fund sur-
veillance improvements in unindustrialized countries.
Unindustrialized countries would oppose a legal requirement to
improve national surveillance without financial commitment
from industrialized countries. The end result would likely be
authorization for WHO to issue recommendations on how
member states should organize national surveillance. WHO
already possesses, however, the power to issue recommenda-
tions (WHO Constitution, Article 23).
The IHR’s second objective seeks maximum protection
against international disease spread with minimum interference
with world traffic (13). The existing IHR contain maximum
measures that member states may take against trade and travel
with respect to cholera, plague, and yellow fever (13). The IHR
did not prevent WHO member states from imposing excessive
and irrational travel- and trade-restricting health measures.
Under WHO’s proposals, the revised IHR would empower
WHO to make recommendations about how member states
should handle “public health emergencies of international con-
cern” (21). 
WHO’s proposals mention “recommendations,” which
presumably would not be legally binding. WHO also proposes,
however, that a core obligation of the revised IHR be that mem-
ber states apply measures recommended by WHO during pub-
lic health emergencies of international concern (21). Why
WHO confuses obligations with recommendations is not clear.
If history is any guide, member states will not allow WHO to
issue binding regulations on an ad hoc basis.
Constitutionally, World Health Assembly approval would
be required before any rule becomes binding (WHO
Constitution, Article 21). This requirement, supported by mem-
ber states’ guarding of sovereignty, means the revised IHR
would only allow WHO to make recommendations about how
member states should handle public health emergencies of
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Table 1. Governance frameworks, public health strategies, and international law on infectious diseases 
Governance framework  Primary strategic emphasis  Function of international law  Infectious disease example 
National   Vertical public health strategies  None  National sanitary reform, 19th century 
International   Horizontal public health strategies  Provides architecture for horizontal 
public health strategies 
International Health Regulations 
Global  
 
Vertical public health strategies  Provides norms informing vertical 
public health strategies 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria  international concern. Such authority would be redundant
because WHO already has the power to issue recommendations
(WHO Constitution, Article 23).
Thus, in connection with minimum interference with
world traffic, the revised IHR would replace legally binding
requirements with the authority to issue nonbinding recommen-
dations, a power WHO already has. This shift does not address
what happens when member states ignore WHO recommenda-
tions. The existing problem of member states’behaving in irra-
tional, unjustified ways against outbreaks in other countries is
left unresolved. 
Today, WTO provides the more important forum for states
concerned about irrational trade-restricting health measures
because of the SPS Agreement and the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. Thus, the second raison d’être of the classical
regime—disciplines against irrational health measures—has
weakened for travel-related measures and migrated to the trade
regime for health measures that restrict trade in goods.
Vertical International Governance 
In addition to the shift from the classical to the trade
regime, new international governance frameworks focusing on
vertical public health strategies were developed in the post-
1945 period. These approaches seek to reform how a govern-
ment deals with its health inside the state’s territory. 
The “soft-law regime” represents guidelines, practices,
and policies generated by international health organizations for
adoption by states. Such norms are not legally binding, which
is why they constitute soft rather than hard law. WHO has gen-
erated many soft-law norms. In fact, WHO has preferred soft
law to the creation of binding legal commitments (24). The hor-
izontal organizational regime has thus proved more valuable
for creating vertical public health strategies than for providing
discipline in interstate public health relations.
The “environmental regime” encompasses international
environmental law, much of which seeks to reduce environ-
mental threats to human health (25,26). Environmental treaties
often require states to reduce environmental degradation with-
in their territories and through cross-border transmission of
harmful products. International environmental law supports
both horizontal and vertical strategies. Such law is, however,
weakest in connection with vertical public health strategies
because it does not address local air and water pollution, the
major environmental cause of illnesses and deaths due to infec-
tious diseases (27).
The “human rights regime” imposes obligations on gov-
ernments for treatment of persons in their territories.
International human rights law is almost entirely vertical in ori-
entation. Although such law has long incorporated public
health, the HIV/AIDS pandemic brought international human
rights law to bear more prominently on public health (28).
Public health experts argue that international human rights law
protects persons living with HIV/AIDS from discrimination
and imposes obligations on governments to respect, protect,
and fulfill their citizens’ human right to health by making pre-
vention and treatment programs universally available (29).
International human rights law contributes to vertical strategies
that seek to control infectious diseases within states rather than
address their cross-border movement.
Global Governance Mechanisms 
The third major change of the post-1945 period is develop-
ment of global governance mechanisms. Global governance
involves states, international organizations, and nonstate enti-
ties, such as multinational corporations and nongovernment
organizations. Nonstate actor involvement distinguishes global
from international governance (8). Nonstate organizations have
long been involved in national and international governance
(30), but globalization has stimulated new forms of governance
in which such organizations have heightened roles. The effec-
tiveness of horizontal international governance through the
organizational regime became a major issue in the late 20th
century. Although WHO eradicated smallpox, the organization
has been ineffective in handling the increasing global devasta-
tion wrought by emerging and reemerging infectious diseases,
especially HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. The organiza-
tional regime’s infectious disease problems have encouraged
exploration of new approaches.
Public health experts increasingly focus on global health
governance (8,31–34), with emphasis on the role of nonstate
organizations. The best examples of this trend are public-pri-
vate partnerships, which have proliferated in global public
health (35). Nonstate actor participation in global governance
efforts ranges from the formal to the informal. Nongovernment
organizations’ presence on the governing body of the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund)
represents formal nonstate participation in global governance
(36). WHO’s use of information from nongovernment sources
in the Global Network informally incorporates nonstate enti-
ties. Global governance mechanisms seek to provide “global
public goods” for health that states, especially unindustrialized
countries, can use within their territories to reduce the preva-
lence of infectious disease. Such global governance mecha-
nisms primarily support vertical public health strategies.
The Access Regime
Many global governance initiatives work to increase access
to drugs, vaccines, and other medicines. Public-private partner-
ships—such as Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization,
Global Alliance on TB Drug Development, and Medicines for
Malaria Venture —seek to develop and/or deliver more effec-
tively new or existing drugs and vaccines in unindustrialized
countries. The Global Fund hopes, for example, to increase
access to antiretrovirals in unindustrialized countries (36). The
global movement to increase access to essential medicines
involves the evolution of a new governance framework—the so-
called access regime—that has become the most prominent
development in international law on infectious diseases.
The access regime arose from the clash of the horizontal
trade regime and the vertical human rights regime. The core of
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greater protection for patented pharmaceutical products with
the human rights-inspired effort to increase access to essential
medicines. The “TRIPS versus public health” battle produced a
dramatic moment in November 2001, when WTO adopted the
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (37).
The Declaration places public health objectives, especially
access to medicines, above the trade-related goal of increasing
pharmaceutical patent protection. Experts see the Declaration
as a victory for the human right to health and for global health
governance (38). 
The involvement of nonstate entities, namely multination-
al pharmaceutical corporations and nongovernment organiza-
tions (e.g., Médecins Sans Frontières) characterizes the devel-
opment of the access regime. Nonstate organizations play
important roles in all aspects of the access regime, particularly
through public-private partnerships for developing new drugs
(e.g., Medicines for Malaria Venture, Global Alliance on TB
Drug Development) or improving access to existing drugs
(e.g., Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, Green
Light Committee on second-line tuberculosis drugs [39]).
Nongovernment organizations’ formal governance role in the
Global Fund provides another indication that the access regime
represents an important development in global governance on
infectious diseases. Finally, governance efforts to improve
access to drugs and vaccines are found within each governance
framework (Table 2). 
The access regime takes the human right to health, devel-
oped originally as vertical international governance, into the
realm of global governance through the leadership of nonstate
organizations. The access regime aims to develop not only gov-
ernance conducive to improved access but also new pharma-
ceutical products that governments, international institutions,
and nonstate organizations can use to reduce illness and death
caused by infectious diseases.
The access regime captures how international law’s func-
tion differs in global governance from its role in international
governance. Norms found in international law, principally the
human right to health, inspire global governance on access;
however, international law does not provide the architecture for
such governance. Public-private partnerships are not based on
treaties. The participation of states and international organiza-
tions in these global governance efforts is nonbinding under
international law. The access regime uses international law dif-
ferently than states and international organizations have used it
for public health since international health diplomacy began in
1851. 
Although many view the access regime as progressive,
concerns exist about its impact on public health. The emphasis
on access may divert attention and resources away from
strengthening overall public health and infectious disease con-
trol infrastructures. The human rights focus may heighten con-
cern for individual healthcare at the expense of protecting pop-
ulation health. Finally, increasing drug access may exacerbate
antimicrobial resistance if proper attention to rational use is
lacking (40). 
Conclusion 
Globalization creates infectious disease challenges that
force states to cooperate. Historically, international law has
been important in facilitating such cooperation. International
law’s use in infectious disease control has to address the gover-
nance challenges that globalization presents public health. The
last 50 years, and the 1990s in particular, have witnessed shifts
in how international law factors into global infectious disease
policy. Within the traditional realm of horizontal international
governance, attention has moved from the classical to the trade
regime, changing the structure and substance of international
law’s role in infectious disease control. In addition, revision of
the IHR signifies the death of the classical regime rather than
its rejuvenation. Such a death would mark the end of the tradi-
tional use of international law for infectious disease control.
Attention has also shifted from horizontal international gover-
nance to vertical global governance. This shift finds interna-
tional law’s traditional function in international governance
supplemented by a context in which international law informs
global governance endeavors that are not legally binding. 
These developments mean that international law’s role in
infectious disease control today has never been more important
and uncertain. International law remains important to horizon-
tal international governance, as indicated by WTO’s interna-
tional legal role in public health. International law also informs
vertical global governance even though these regimes find no
formal expression in international law. Uncertainty looms,
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Table 2. The access regime and governance frameworks
a 
National governance  International governance  Global governance 
NGO activism directed at MNCs, international 
organizations, and national governments  
(e.g., MSF’s global campaign opposing 
pharmaceutical MNCs’ lawsuit against 
South Africa) 
Involvement of MNCs and NGOs in drug-
development PPPs 
NGO lawsuits filed in national court systems to force 
national governments to increase access to 
HIV/AIDS therapies under the human right to health 
(e.g., South African case of Treatment Action 
Campaign v. Minister of Health (July 2002)) 
Unindustrialized-country and WHO advocacy to 
strengthen the public health safeguards in TRIPS 
to ensure access to affordable drugs and 
medicines (e.g., Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health) 
Formal governance roles for nonstate actors in 
new institutions (e.g., Global Fund) 
aNGOs, nongovernment organizations; WHO, World Health Organization; TRIPS, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; MNCs, multinational 
corporations; MSF, Médecins Sans Frontières; PPPs, public-private partnerships. however, in the IHR revision process, questions about WTO’s
impact on public health, and concerns that vertical global gov-
ernance will not deliver global public goods for health in an
important and sustainable manner.
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